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LIVE AND LET LOVE: SELF­
DETERMINATION IN MATTERS OF 
INTIMACY AND IDENTITY 
Kim Forde-Mazrui* 
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND 
ADOPTION. By Randall Kennedy. New York: Pantheon Books. 2003. 
Pp. viii, 677. $30. 
INTRODUCTION 
Are you free to choose the race of your spouse, . . .  of your 
child, . . .  of yourself? Historically, the legal and social answer to these 
questions was No. Matters of racial identity and interracial intimacy 
were strictly circumscribed by ideologies of racial essentialism and 
separation, ostensibly rooted in science, morality, and religion. In 
contrast, according to Professor Randall Kennedy1 in his new book, 
Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage, Identity, and Adoption, the 
answer to all three questions should be a resounding Yes. The exclu­
sive source of racial identification and intimacy should be individual 
choice, free from legal and social interference. The reality today is 
somewhere in between. In matters of sexual and marital intimacy, the 
law takes a neutral posture, but significant social constraints remain. 
And in matters of adoption and racial identity, both law and social 
norms continue, albeit with decreasing fervor, to restrain individual 
cboice in service of collective notions of racial appropriateness. 
Kennedy challenges remaining obstacles to individual self­
determination in matters of interracial intimacy and identity. He takes 
a candid look at America's historical and continuing aversion to 
intimacy between people of different races, an inquiry that reveals the 
* Professor of Law and Barron F. Black Research Professor, University of Virginia; 
Director, University of Virginia Center for the Study of Race and Law; Visiting Professor of 
Law, University of Michigan (2003-04). A.B. 1990, J.D. 1993, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
I am grateful for the helpful comments I received on an earlier draft from Barb Armacost, 
Rick Banks, Anne Coughlin, Allen Flynn, Mike Klarman, Clarisa Long, and Buffie Scott, as 
well as the participants in the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference of 
2003. I thank Yale Kamisar for suggesting this project. A special thanks to Davern! Swinson 
and Will Forde-Mazrui for their diligent research assistance. I dedicate this Review to my 
parents, Ali Al'Amin Mazrui and Molly Vickerman Walker, my wife, Kay Forde-Mazrui, 
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deep and pathological nature of America's racial ideology. He also 
considers the meaning of race and the burdens imposed by essentialist 
definitions of race on the identities and intimate relations of those who 
would live otherwise. Finally, Kennedy criticizes America's continued 
resistance to interracial adoption, particularly involving black and 
Native American or Indian2 children, a resistance that, in Kennedy's 
view, favors culturalist agendas at the expense of children's welfare. 
The book is not, however, pessimistic. It is inspiring. Although 
opposition to interracial intimacy has reflected a repugnant and often 
brutal ideology of racial hierarchy, interracial relationships have 
always developed, revealing the indomitable power of human inti­
macy. Moreover, significant progress has occurred in the direction 
of racial tolerance. Kennedy hopes this progress will continue, aided 
by his book, which aims to "mov[ e] interracial intimacy to center stage 
as a necessary focus of inquiry for anyone seriously interested in 
understanding and improving American society" (p. 12). 
Interracial Intimacies will draw criticism from some quarters. 
Critics will have difficulty, however, in challenging the scholarliness of 
Kennedy's methodology, as he endeavors to take competing perspec­
tives seriously, considering their merits with a degree of balance, 
precision, detail, and candor on issues which are all too often discussed 
in abstract generality and hyperbole. Instead, critics are likely to take 
issue with Kennedy's ideology. He is a liberal individualist who consis­
tently defends private choice regarding intimacy and identity, against 
interference from the state or groups claiming control over personal 
intimacy for the sake of communal interests. The most public criticism 
will likely come from blacks on the left. Kennedy unflinchingly criti­
cizes all justifications for discouraging interracial intimacy, including 
claims that multiracial relationships and identities undermine black 
cultural and political solidarity. Other likely critics include traditional 
racialists, who believe the races are fundamentally distinct and should 
not intermingle, particularly in the context of sex, marriage, and adop­
tion. Although likely less open in their criticism in today's racial 
climate, traditional racialists exist in substantial numbers, as revealed 
by polls indicating that one in five white Americans believe interracial 
marriage should be illegal.3 Because I largely agree with Kennedy's 
ideology, my criticisms are few, and I recommend the book whole­
heartedly. 
2. Whether Native American people should be referred to as "Native American" or 
"Indian" is a matter of controversy. I will use "Indian" in this Review because of the cen­
trality of that term to the Indian Child Welfare Act and other legal doctrines addressing 
Native American people, and because Kennedy uses the term in the book. 
3. See Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing With Loving?: Race, Law, and 
Intermarriage, 77 B.U. L. REV. 815, 820 (1997). 
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Interracial Intimacies also has important implications beyond race. 
The principles advanced by Kennedy in defense of individual freedom 
and self-determination in matters of intimacy and identity afford a 
basis for evaluating social and legal restrictions on the intimate rela­
tions of homosexual4 people. The human ideals of love, trust, and 
com�assion that Kennedy advocates and celebrates arguably should 
exter..d to those members of our community who happen to fall in love 
with people of the same sex. Accordingly, in addition to promoting 
racia. tolerance, the lessons of Interracial Intimacies counsel greater 
tolerance for intrasexual intimacies. 
In Part I, in addition to describing the book, I identify and analyze 
Kennedy's core claims about the legitimate role of the state and social 
groups in matters of interracial sex, marriage, identity, and adoption. 
Although I agree substantially with Kennedy's perspective, I question 
his quite radical position that racial identity should be exclusively a 
matter of personal choice.5 His position, I argue, is unrealistic at the 
present time and, more importantly, threatens to undermine efforts to 
remedy the effects of past racial discrimination and to deter present 
discrimination. I also criticize Kennedy's opposition to race matching 
in adoption as too extreme, in that he would oppose consideration of 
race even if evidence persuasively demonstrated that same-race 
placements were in general better for black children.6 I broaden my 
focus, in Part II, to intimacies between people of the same sex. I argue 
that the principles on which Kennedy relies for accepting interracial 
intimacies support the acceptance of intrasexual intimacies. 
I. INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES 
A. Sex and Marriage 
Kennedy's historical account reveals certain defining features of 
America's ideological opposition to interracial sex and marriage. A 
principal underlying premise of that opposition was an understanding 
of nature and scientific truth. Racial groups were understood as 
fundamentally different, and intimate relations between them were 
considered unnatural. Those who would engage in such relationships 
were commonly believed to be mentally disturbed or overcome 
by bestial passion. Another justification for opposing interracial rela­
tionships was morality and religious doctrine. In justifying Virginia's 
antimiscegenation law, for example, the lower court in Loving v. 
4. Whether people who desire sexual or marital intimacy with people of the same sex 
should be referred to as "homosexual." "gay and lesbian," or by some other term is outside 
the scope of this Review. I mean "intrasexual," "homosexual," "same sex," and "gay and 
lesbian" to be interchangeable. 
5. See infra Section LC. 
6. See infra Section LB. 
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Virginia7 explained, "Almighty God created the races white, black, 
yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents . . . .  
The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for 
the races to mix."8 Similarly, Massachusetts defended its antimiscege­
nation law as fulfilling the "Infinite Wisdom" of "God's design."9 
Remarkable was the strength and depth of opposition. "[A]mong 
white southerners," Kennedy found, "the proscription against interra­
cial marriage and sexual intercourse constituted the racial discrimina­
tion of greatest importance, and thus the one most in need of defense" 
(p. 85). Of all segregationist laws, prohibitions of interracial sex and 
marriage were the most numerous and geographically widespread; 
among such laws, only blacks were universally barred from marrying 
whites. Indeed, every other segregationist law was defended in part on 
the need to deter interracial intimacy, and proposals to grant legal 
rights to blacks were opposed most effectively with the simple ques­
tion, "Do you want your daughter to marry a Negro?"10 Opposition to 
interracial relations was also defined by an emotional aversion that 
provoked white people on mere suspicion to participate in brutal 
lynchings of black men, often involving the mutilation, castration, and 
burning of their live bodies. Indeed, the "[i]magery of the black man 
as sexual predator . . .  helped facilitate the lynching that claimed 
between four and five thousand black lives from the 1880s to the 
1960s" (p. 192; citations omitted). 
An ironic feature of America's ideology has been its preference for 
interracial relationships of a purely physical or even coercive nature 
over sexual relationships involving genuine affection or, worse, marital 
commitment. Several states, such as Louisiana, banned intermarriage 
but not interracial sex. And while other states proscribed both sexual 
and marital miscegenation, the latter laws were often enforced with 
greater rigor. Although in Alabama, for example, interracial fornica­
tion was criminally prosecuted, conviction required proof of an 
ongoing relationship; occasional sex was not enough. "Tolerant 
though it might be of a loveless interracial quickie, or even a commer­
cial transaction, Alabama law was intolerant of interracial romance" 
(p. 215). And, in general, "[w]hile relations between white men and 
black women could be approved of, or at least tolerated, as sexual 
exercise or comic diversion, a white man faced sanctions if he revealed 
7. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
8. P. 274 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (internal citation and quotation marks omit­
ted)). 
9. P. 245 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 25TH CONG., REPORT 
RESPECTING DISTINCTIONS OF COLOR (Feb. 25, 1839), reprinted in LIBERATOR (Mar. 15, 
1839) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
10. P. 22 (quoting Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amend­
ment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224, 1227 (1966) (internal quotation marks omit­
ted)). 
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genuine feeling for a black lover or children" (p. 76). As Frederick 
Douglas explained, "[w]hat they typically objected to . .. was 'not a 
mixture of the races, but honorable marriage between them.' "11 
Consider also the controversy surrounding Thomas Jefferson and 
Sally Hemings. Jefferson's exalted place in American history has 
prevailed despite his direct participation in slavery, yet his reputation 
has received its most serious challenge, both during his life and today, 
by allegations that he had a sexual relationship with one of his slaves, 
especially the possibility that the relationship involved mutual affec­
tion. One Jefferson biographer, Dumas Malone, who steadfastly 
denied a Jefferson-Hemings affair, eventually conceded that sex be­
tween them "might have happened once or twice."12 "Unwilling to 
admit the barest possibility of an emotionally serious relationship 
between his hero and Hemings,'' Kennedy observes, "Malone pre­
ferred to posit the alternative of an emotionally barren one-night 
stand" (p. 55). 
Finally, opposition to interracial sex and marriage has been justi­
fied on procreative grounds. Interracial sex, it was feared, would 
produce a "mongrel breed" of mentally defective or otherwise geneti­
cally inferior children (pp. 270, 274, 298). Defending its ban on inter­
racial marriage in 1948, for example, California argued to the state 
supreme court that the law protected against the risk of physically and 
mentally inferior children.13 And eugenicist fears prompted a proposal 
in New York that would have tolerated racial intermarriage provided 
the couple submitted to sterilization (p. 255). One can thus discern, in 
reverse order of customary family values, an ascending hierarchy of 
interracial wrongs: sex, intimate sex, marriage, and marriage with 
children. 
Kennedy's inquiry into interracial intimacy in the context of sex 
and marriage is detailed, well-documented, and rich in narrative. 
Many of his normative claims are implicit in lessons suggested by 
the exploration. One lesson that emerges is that the opposition to 
interracial sex and marriage has been, and to some extent continues to 
be, devastatingly destructive to the lives of those who deign to love 
across racial lines. An additional, contrasting lesson is that, despite the 
strength of legal and social sanctions, people have sought interracial 
intimacy throughout American history. Even in the context of slavery, 
"in the least nurturing of soils" (p. 69), genuine intimacy bloomed 
between whites and blacks, notwithstanding the risk of familial and 
11. P. 74 (quoting WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 100 
(1984) (quoting the OSWEGO RECORD, Feb. 2, 1884) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
12. P. 55 (quoting Scot A. French & Edward L. Ayers, The Strange Career of Thomas 
Jefferson: Race and Slavery in American Memory, 1943-1993, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 
418, 444 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
13. P. 263 (discussing Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948)). 
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societal ostracism, criminal punishment, enslavement, and violence. 
Such relationships provide an inspiring testament to the strength of 
love in the face of collective prohibition: 
At every turn, the impulse to maintain a strict, clean, consistent racial 
order was confounded by the force and consequences of passion, com­
passion, and ingenuity. In the end, the antimiscegenation laws were un­
able to ensure or re-create white racial chastity because desire, humanity, 
and hypocrisy kept getting in the way. (p. 223) 
There is also a lesson of hope. Tolerance for interracial sex and 
marriage has increased substantially. The law, rightfully, has become 
formally permissive, and social antagonisms have lessened signifi­
cantly. Between 1960 and 2000, for instance, black-white marriages 
increased more than sixfold (p. 126). Accordingly, Kennedy observes, 
"despite the black-power backlash and the remnants of white hostility 
to 'race mixing,' the most salient fact about interracial intimacies 
today is that those involved in them have never been in a stronger 
position, or one in which optimism regarding the future was more 
realistic" (p. 124). Kennedy desires this trend to continue, envisioning 
a world in which neither state, community, nor family discourage 
interracial intimacy and, further, that in matters of the heart, individu­
als would give no consideration to race in their own personal choices. 
Kennedy's vision is one of optimism, a recognition that differences 
between people of different races are, ultimately, only skin deep, and 
that love genuinely can be color-blind. 
B. Adoption 
Kennedy's most pointed attack on state-sponsored constraints on 
interracial intimacy appears in the final chapters on adoption.1 4  Where 
earlier chapters on sex and marriage were more suggestive than 
demanding, these chapters advance arguments for immediate legal 
change, namely, the abolition of "race matching,'' a policy "which 
assigns children a permanent racial identity and requires that they be 
raised by adults of the same race" (p. 367). As I have also argued 
elsewhere,15 race-matching practices harm the children they are 
supposed to help by denying them adoptive parents based on 
misguided and unsubstantiated fears over interracial adoption. 
In the child-placement context, as with sex and marriage, one can 
observe the usual ordering of family values being subordinated to 
racial separationism. In Louisiana, for example, a court in the 1950s 
refused to permit a black couple to adopt a child because the child was 
classified (erroneously) as white, and state law absolutely barred 
14. See chapters 9-12. 
15. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests 
of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925 (1994). 
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transracial adoption.16 The state instead relegated the child to an 
orphanage. "The state believed, in other words, that it was better for a 
child to be reared in an institution, no matter how bad, than to be 
adopted into a family of a different race, no matter how good" (p. 12). 
During the same period, a District of Columbia trial court refused to 
permit a black man to adopt his wife's nonmarital or "illegitimate"17 
white son whom they had raised alongside their two biological 
children since marrying.18 The court thus ruled, "in essence, that it 
would be better for the boy to remain illegitimate but white than to 
become legitimate but black - or, more precisely, to become the legal 
son of a black man" (pp. 390-91). 
Despite the invalidation of strict race-matching laws in the 1960s, 
race matching persists in practice. Such policies are, of course, no 
longer officially justified by segregationist ideology, but rather are 
defended as necessary to protect the racial identity of black children 
and to teach them skills for coping with racism. They are also justified 
as necessary to safeguard the interests of black people as a culturally 
distinct group. Some proponents of race matching acknowledge the 
desirability, in theory, of placing children without regard to race, but 
claim that the reality of pervasive racial prejudice justifies preferring 
to place black children with black parents. The most ardent propo­
nents of race-matching policies are themselves black. The National 
Association of Black Social Workers has condemned the transracial 
placement of black (and biracial) children with white parents as 
"cultural genocide," and have succeeded, through political pressure, in 
curtailing the transracial placement of black children.1 9  Child­
placement officials and courts give so much credence to fears over 
transracial placement that such placements are routinely denied 
notwithstanding constitutional constraints on race-conscious state 
action and recent federal law prohibiting delayed or denied adoption 
on account of race.20 
Kennedy rightfully places the burden on those who oppose trans­
racial placement to substantiate the purported risks involved. They 
should bear the burden of proof because of the healthy suspicion 
about racial discrimination - particularly when done by the state -
16. See pp. 8-12 (discussing Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App. 
1956)). 
17. I prefer the term "nonmarital" to refer to children born to an unmarried mother 
rather than the traditional term "illegitimate," a term which unfairly stigmatizes children for 
the conduct of their parents. The courts used the term "illegitimate," however, which serves 
to emphasize how negatively they viewed transracial adoptions, as worse for children than 
social invalidity. 
18. See pp. 390-92 (discussing In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955), 
which reversed the trial court's decision). 
19. See pp. 452-53; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 15, at 925. 
20. See Inter-Ethnic Placement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (Supp. II 1997). 
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which our society has learned from history. In addition, the serious 
and predictable harm to children of having no parents, no one "in 
their corner . . .  whose primary responsibility, twenty-four hours a day, 
is the well-being of his or her charges" (p. 405), further justifies 
requiring those who would deny black children parents simply because 
their would-be parents are white to demonstrate persuasively that the 
risks of transracial placement outweigh the harm of continued 
parentlessness. In Kennedy's assessment, race-matching proponents 
have failed utterly to make this case. 
Kennedy's most palpable skepticism is toward allegations that 
white parents are presumptively incompetent to foster an appropriate 
or authentic cultural identity in black children. Such arguments, for 
Kennedy, represent a form of communal imperialism by blacks who 
claim authority over black authenticity. Nor have race-matching 
proponents adequately demonstrated that white parents are inferior to 
black parents in teaching black children how to cope with race-related 
difficulties. The simple observation that some transracial adoptees 
experience difficulty over racial issues, and even that some believe 
race matching is preferable, fails adequately to recognize that many if 
not most black Americans have experienced difficulty over their racial 
identity. No consensus among blacks has ever emerged regarding the 
most successful strategy for coping with racism; indeed, many blacks 
fail to cope successfully, a fact generally ignored by race-matching 
proponents who presume the fitness of black parents to raise healthy 
racial identities in black children. 
Nor are Kennedy's criticisms reserved for state policies involving 
black children. He also challenges the Indian Child Welfare Act 
("ICWA"),21 which mandates a preference for placing Indian children 
with Indian families. Kennedy accuses Congress of having too readily 
deferred to claims by some Indians that the placement of Indian 
children with non-Indian families is one of the primary threats to the 
cultural existence of Indian tribes. The risks to Indian preservation lie 
elsewhere, Kennedy believes, in the social and economic problems 
that Indian people disproportionately experience, problems from 
which ICW A dangerously distracts society's attention. He also 
criticizes arguments for Indian cultural preservation as a "rhetorical 
bogeyman" (p. 513) that would freeze Indian cultures in time rather 
than afford them the benefits of transformation through interaction 
with the modern world. Whatever the long-term effects of transracial 
placement on Indian cultural concerns, the best interests of individual 
Indian children require finding them permanent homes as soon as 
possible. 
Kennedy would thus prohibit the state from discouraging the 
placement of children of any race with parents of a different race. He 
21. 25 u.s.c. § 1901 (2000). 
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would do so, moreover, even assuming black parents were in general 
better able to raise black children, although he would permit consid­
eration of race where compelling evidence in a specific case justified it, 
such as where an older child insisted on being adopted by parents of a 
particular race. "Rigorous adherence to this antidiscrimination regime 
is an essential requirement for ridding society of the pernicious habit 
of submerging individuals in the racial group to which they are said to 
belong" (pp. 412-13). He also opposes race matching by private 
placement agencies, although the use of state power to enforce race­
matching policies raises greater concern for him. 
Kennedy recognizes the limited effect of legally proscribing race 
matching so long as placement workers and judges vested with broad 
discretion believe that transracial placement is harmful. Accordingly, 
in addition to legal reform, Kennedy would hope to educate the public 
to reduce race-matching practices: "[I]n the long run, the transforma­
tion of public opinion is even more important than the transformation 
of legal formalities. The judicial system, by itself, will never satisfacto­
rily police the conduct of decision makers whose personal aims and 
sentiments are in opposition to the law" (p. 376). 
Kennedy would, however, permit adoptive parents to pursue their 
own racial preferences in adopting, even when using state-sponsored 
agencies.22 Although racial preferences by adoptive parents are regret­
table and contribute to the underadoption of minority children, the 
interests of children and respect for the choices of adoptive parents 
counsel against requiring adoptive parents to accept children they do 
not want. At least by requiring neutrality toward transracial adoption 
on the part of the state, the changes Kennedy advocates would allow a 
number of adoptions across racial lines to proceed and may, in the 
longer term, contribute to parental interest in adopting black children 
by expressing the message that transracial adoptions are not second 
best. 
Kennedy's recommendations regarding race and adoption are on 
the whole sound, including permitting adoptive parents to pursue their 
own racial preferences in order to avoid placing children with parents 
predisposed against them. Where he goes too far, however, is in his 
willingness to prohibit consideration of race even if it were true "that 
for the most part, black adoptive parents are better able to raise black 
children than white adoptive parents'' (p. 412). My own opposition to 
race matching is premised on the conclusion that the serious and 
known costs to children of delayed adoption outweigh the speculative 
and unsubstantiated risks of transracial adoption, especially given that 
22. See pp. 434-36 (responding to the thoughtful and provocative argument by Professor 
Richard Banks for prohibiting state child-placement agencies from accommodating adoptive 
parents' racial preferences, see R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive 
Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998)). 
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transracial adoption may offer certain benefits over inracial place­
ments. Were serious risks from transracial adoption persuasively 
substantiated, however, it would be difficult to justify ignoring such 
risks if the interests of children are to remain a central concern in 
child-placement decisions. Kennedy would reject reliance on such 
"generalizations" on the ground that children should be treated as 
individuals, and not as mere members of racial groups. The placement 
of children, however, which involves predicting the likely success of 
particular placements, necessarily involves generalizations about the 
circumstances of prospective parents and child. Factors routinely 
considered by placement agencies, such as the age, psychological 
fitness, financial stability, and home environment of prospective 
parents are based on generalizations grounded in experience and 
social science. Individualizing the assessment involves taking as much 
relevant information into account as possible, but the conclusions 
drawn from such information necessarily involve reliance on generali­
zations. Even the two exceptions in which Kennedy would permit race 
to be considered - where an older child or the adoptive parents ex­
press a racial preference - involve the generalization that holding 
such preferences today will likely affect the future success of the 
placement. Indeed, even the assumption that adoption is preferable to 
institutional care, an assumption Kennedy apparently endorses, in­
volves a generalization about the benefits of adoption over transient 
care. Such a generalization may turn out to be inaccurate in particular 
cases, yet taking it into account in the placement of children is not 
only rational but commendable. Similarly, if transracial placements 
were generally more harmful to children than inracial placements, 
then the interests of those children would be served by taking race 
into account, provided the generalization may be overcome when 
other factors in a given case support a transracial placement. None­
theless, given that race-matching proponents have failed to justify 
their opposition to transracial adoption (as Kennedy persuasively 
demonstrates), Kennedy's opposition to state-encouraged race 
matching is well founded. 
C. Identity 
Recurring throughout the chapters on sex, marriage, and adoption 
are issues related to racial identity, the definition and categorization of 
race by law, custom, and individual choice. Two chapters23 focus more 
directly on racial identity by exploring the phenomenon of "passing."24 
23. See chapters 7-8. 
24. Kennedy 's research consulted much of the rich literature on the phenomenon of 
passing. See, e.g., p. 570 n.7 (citing LOUIS FREMONT BALDWIN, FROM NEGRO TO 
CAUCASIAN, OR How THE ETHIOPIAN Is CHANGING HIS SKIN (1929); MARJORIE GARBER, 
SYMPTOMS OF CULTURE (1998); SUSAN GUBAR, RACECHANGES: WHITE SKIN, BLACK 
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Kennedy defines passing as the practice by which a person inten­
tionally deceives others, by misrepresentation or omission, into 
believing he is a different race from that into which societal conven­
tions would define him (pp. 283-85). The practice of passing, over­
whelmingly by light-skinned blacks passing as white, has occurred in 
nontrivial numbers throughout American history. A number of moti­
vations lay behind the decision to pass, and other motivations are 
attributed to passers whether or not true. Such motives may, but need 
not, involve a desire to be white or to reject blackness as inferior. 
More common is the simple desire to gain the rights and benefits of 
being perceived as white. 
The stories of passing recounted by Kennedy reveal the heavy 
burdens upon those who would pass and the families from which they 
came. Passers had to be ever vigilant in concealing their racial identi­
ties, often having to separate their lives from that of their biological 
families. In one story (p. 312), for example, a son wrote a letter to his 
mother in which he apologized for pretending not to recognize her 
while passing her on the street with his white paramour. Passers who 
were discovered faced hostile and often violent reactions, including 
from the white families into which they had married. In some cases, 
whites sought divorces or annulments after discovering the spouses 
they thought they loved turned out to be black.25 Whites desperately 
sought to prevent such infiltration of their ranks, including by hiring 
blacks to help identify "white negroes" (p. 314). Blacks faced a 
dilemma whether to "out" passers, whose deception may reflect a 
rejection of blackness, given the risks to passers from revelation. 
Although the great majority of passers were and are people of 
color passing as white, some cases of whites passing as black have 
recently emerged. Mark Stebbins, for example, a city council-member 
representing a Latino and black constituency in Stockton, California, 
was alleged by a political rival to be actually white (pp. 333-34). His 
birth certificate said he was white, but he had concluded as a young 
adult that based on certain physical features, he was black. He appar­
ently held himself out as black thereafter, married twice to black 
women, one of whom he met at an NAACP meeting, and engaged 
FACE IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1997); ADAM LIVELY, MASKS: BLACKNESS, RACE, AND 
THE IMAGINATION (2000); WERNER SOLLORS, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: THEMATIC 
EXPLORATIONS OF INTERRACIAL LITERATURE (1997); EVERETT V. STONEQUIST, THE 
MARGINAL MAN: A STUDY IN PERSONALITY AND CULTURE (1937); GAYLE WALD, 
CROSSING THE LINE: RACIAL PASSING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY U.S. LITERATURE AND 
CULTURE (2000); PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY (Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., 1996); 
G. Reginald Daniel, Passers and Pluralists: Subverting the Racial Divide, in RACIALLY 
MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 91 (Maria P. P. Roots ed., 1992); Robert Westley, First-Time 
Encounters: "Passing" Revisited and Demystification As a Critical Practice, 18 YALE L. & 
POL'Y REV. 297 (2000); and Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The 
Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998)). 
25. See pp. 295-97. 
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in civil rights activism. Nonetheless, the allegations that he was 
only passing as black resulted in his electoral recall. In Boston, 
Massachusetts, two Malone brothers claimed to be black on employ­
ment forms for the fire department in order to benefit from affirma­
tive action. Ruling against them,· the personnel administrator deter­
mined that the biological evidence was inconclusive, the firefighters 
had never held themselves out as black elsewhere, and their identifica­
tion as black was insincere. Kennedy approves the administrator's 
apparent willingness to credit the Malones' claim to blackness 
provided it was sincerely held, even if the biological evidence did not 
support it. Such an approach reflects "the healthy intuition that a free 
society ought to permit its members to freely enter and exit racial 
categories - even for the purpose of gaining access to public entitle­
ment programs - fettered only by the bonds of good faith" (p. 336). 
Kennedy's examination of passing reveals the extent to which 
America has sought to categorize people into fixed racial groups 
determined by nature, morality, and law, but not by choice. The very 
concept of passing is premised on the view that race is determined by 
immutable standards, and thus the attempt to identify inconsistent 
with those standards must reflect mistake or deceit. Whether under­
stood as principally biological or socially constructed, conceptions of 
race have been collectively imposed on individuals and the relation­
ships they form. There has been recent movement, however, to 
enhance personal choice over the definition of race. A multiracial 
movement has gained ground in which people of mixed racial ancestry 
assert the right to identify as such, the most prominent example 
of which is golf superstar Tiger Woods's self-identification as 
"Cablinasian."26 Despite the erosion of the "one drop" rule,27 people 
of mixed heritage, especially involving black ancestry, continue 
generally to be defined legally and socially as one race, and that of 
inferior status. Moreover, the notion of complete freedom to define 
one's race, such as a person with obvious black ancestry identifying as 
white, remains untenable in America. Nonetheless, achieving such 
freedom is Kennedy's aspiration. He argues that racial identity ought 
to be exclusively a matter of personal choice, regardless of biology or 
cultural convention, limited, if at all, by a requirement of good faith: 
A well-ordered multiracial society ought to allow its members free entry 
into and exit from racial categories, even if the choices they make clash 
with traditional understandings of who is "black" and who is "white," 
and even if, despite making such choices in good faith, individuals mis­
lead observers who rely on conventional racial signaling. Rather than 
26. Woods coined the term to reflect his Caucasian, Black, Indian, and Asian ancestry. 
See p. 143. 
27. The widely followed "one drop" rule defined a person as black if he had any trace­
able black ancestry. Seep. 223. 
May 2003] Live and Let Love 2197 
seeking to bind people forever to the racial classifications into which they 
are born, we should try both to eradicate the deprivations that make 
some want to pass and to protect individuals' racial self-determination, 
including their ability to revise stated racial identities. (p. 333) 
I am troubled by the potential effect, at the present time, of leaving 
racial identification exclusively to personal choice. A principal concern 
I have is that permitting self-definition could seriously undermine 
efforts to remedy past discrimination, and to monitor and deter 
present discrimination. Measured by traditional definitions of race, 
stark disparities persist between blacks and whites, most likely as a 
result of the historical discrimination against people classified as black. 
Only by using the same definitions can American society identify the 
people likely disadvantaged by historical discrimination and determine 
whether the effects of such discrimination have been remedied. If, for 
example, whites could freely identify as black, then affirmative action 
designed to benefit blacks as a means of remedying past discrimina­
tion would be undermined to the extent whites not burdened by past 
discrimination could claim opportunistically to be black. Additionally, 
complete choice over racial identity could undermine antidiscrimina­
tion laws. An employer could, for example, discriminate against 
people who are black according to conventional standards, while 
instead hiring whites who identify themselves as black. Under 
Kennedy's conception of race, however, the employer could claim 
accurately to have a racially diverse workforce. 
Kennedy recognizes the risk to remedial policies, but notes that 
white claims to blackness have been rare. This is hardly reassuring, 
however, given that its rarity probably reflects· an assumption on the 
part of most whites that it would be illegal and socially unacceptable 
to claim to be black, or that such claims might be socially irreversible 
along with the costs of being black in American society. If, in contrast, 
custom and law expressly permitted racial self-definition, then many 
more whites would likely claim to be black in order to receive prefer­
ential benefits, only to redefine themselves as white for other 
purposes. 
Kennedy does suggest one condition on racial self-definition that 
may ameliorate these concerns - a requirement of good faith. But 
administering a good faith standard could create its own problems. For 
example, would good faith require consistency, i.e., whatever race one 
chooses must remain one's race for all purposes? While this may 
reduce the risk of fraud, it would seem to undermine the freedom of 
choice Kennedy advocates. Individual sovereignty over racial identifi­
cation should include the right to change one's race as one chooses. 
Alternatively, a condition of good faith could require courts and other 
governmental actors to scrutinize the declarant's life to determine 
whether he lived as the race he declared. This was part of the 
approach taken by the personnel administrator in the Boston 
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firefighters case (pp. 334-35). Again, however, this would seem to be 
inconsistent with the choice to change one's race as desired and, more 
troublesome, could involve courts in deciding whether particular 
lifestyles comported with particular races. In determining whether one 
lived as a black person, for example, would courts consider the kind of 
community one chose to live in, the church one attended, or the race 
of one's spouse? Indulging in such racial stereotypes would seem to 
violate Kennedy's rejection of state- and community-imposed notions 
of racial authenticity.28 Kennedy himself sharply criticizes a proposal 
that birth certificates be required to include race to ensure against 
fraudulently obtained affirmative-action benefits, noting that he would 
prefer the elimination of racial preferences "if intrusive racial policing 
were to become part of their price" (p. 337). 
The only way to protect freedom of choice over racial identity 
without intrusive governmental inquiries into the veracity of such 
choices would be to give no legal significance to race. Indeed, this 
would appear to be an implication of Kennedy's ideology, which he 
comes close to accepting in the adoption context in which "[r]ace­
dependent decision making . . .  strengthens a reflex that we should 
seek to overcome: the impulse to lump people together according to 
gross (in this case, racial) classifications, which tend to cloud rather 
than clarify our perception of the human virtues and vices in which we 
should be most interested" (pp. 411-12). Kennedy acknowledges that 
advocating colorblindness in the child-placement process could lend 
political support to those opposed to affirmative action. While believ­
ing the two race-conscious practices are distinguishable, Kennedy 
concedes the risks of his argument and is willing to eliminate affirma­
tive action if necessary for the elimination of race-conscious adoption 
practices. And, as mentioned previously, Kennedy would abolish 
affirmative action if guarding against fraud required state-imposed 
racial identities. Ultimately, if personal choice over racial identity is to 
be unfettered, the maintenance of state-sponsored policies that award 
benefits according to race would seem to be untenable. No racial 
discriminations by the state could be permitted. 
At a more fundamental level, Kennedy's theory of racial self­
definition is a radical departure from the historical meaning of race in 
American society. Few Americans would accept that a person's race is 
truly whatever one chooses. Even conservatives, who have in recent 
28. Illustrative of associating lifestyle with race is Kennedy's description of Mark Steb­
bins, the city-council member who was recalled for purportedly claiming falsely to be black. 
Kennedy notes that, after young adulthood when Stebbins claims he decided he was black, 
he devoted himself to civil rights causes and married twice to black women. P. 333. It is not 
clear whether Kennedy cites these facts as evidence of Stebbins's good faith. The reference 
to these facts nevertheless raises the question whether Stebbins's claim to blackness would 
appear less sincere if he had married only white women or never engaged in civil rights ac­
tivism. Kennedy's aversion to group-based standards of racial authenticity would seem to 
require rejecting such an analysis. 
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years taken up the mantle of colorblindness, assume that those 
burdened by affirmative action are properly classified as white but 
argue that the government should not take race into account. Addi­
tionally, conservative support for racial profiling by law enforcement 
suggests a belief that government may sometimes treat people 
according to conventional racial categories regardless of the race peo­
ple choose for themselves. Whatever one's views on state-sponsored 
race-conscious action, few Americans of any political persuasion 
would accept that people whose physical appearance and biological 
heritage by conventional standards would define them as exclusively a 
particular race could accurately claim to be whatever race they chose. 
Such a concept violates the common understanding of race as an 
objective, immutable, genetically inherited trait. Granted, as many 
race scholars have argued,29 much of the significance of race is socially 
constructed, but that construction has been built upon a physiological 
reality of pigmentation and physiognomy. An understanding of race as 
a purely subjective identity, regardless of appearance or ancestry, is 
fundamentally different. At a minimum, Kennedy's views would re­
quire the complete separation of race and state and, taken to their 
logical end, would eliminate the concept of race altogether as a 
socially relevant marker. Because the full implications of his reconcep­
tualization of race are not certain, I am unable to endorse it. Moreo­
ver, as previously stated, my desire to remedy past discrimination 
cautions against his position for the short term. Nonetheless, the 
potential effect in the long term of rendering race either irrelevant or, 
like religion, a matter for private choice is certainly intriguing. At the 
very least, the strong resistance his views will likely receive reveals the 
depth of America's conception of race as an essential and immutable 
classification into which we are born, . . .  and die. 
II. INTRASEXUAL INTIMACIES 
Kennedy's critique of historic laws and attitudes toward interracial 
intimacies appears to be founded on a number of principles. They 
include that intimacy between consenting adults of different races 
should be valued and in any case is inevitable to the human condition; 
that punishing or otherwise discouraging such intimacy is destructive 
to people's lives; that scientific, religious, and moral justifications for 
opposing interracial intimacy are unfounded or otherwise inadequate; 
and that, ultimately, human flourishing and happiness are best 
29. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations 
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994); Deborah 
Ramirez & Jana Rumminger, Race, Culture, and the New Diversity in the New Millennium, 
31 CUMB. L. REV. 481, 483 (2001); Judy Scales-Trent, Women of Color and Health: Issues of 
Gender, Community, and Power, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1363 (1991); Westley, supra note 
24, at 307. 
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promoted by legal and social tolerance of individual choice and 
privacy in matters of intimacy and identity. The question suggested by 
Kennedy's inquiry is whether the mistakes made and lessons learned 
regarding interracial intimacies have implications for intrasexual inti­
macies. To the extent state and societal constraints on personal choice 
in this context are destructive to human happiness, Kennedy's inquiry 
at least suggests a reason to evaluate the basis of such constraints.30 
Striking parallels between current opposition toward intrasexual or 
homosexual intimacies and historical opposition to interracial intima­
cies justify comparing the two contexts. Opposition to homosexual 
intimacy, like historical opposition to interracial intimacy, is rooted in 
an ideology of nature. Same-sex relationships are commonly rejected 
as unnatural or bestial, a violation of the biologically appropriate form 
of sexual relations between man and woman. Relatedly, same-sex 
relationships, like interracial relationships, have been considered a 
product of mental defect, including by the psychological profession. 
Although homosexuality has been declassified as a mental disorder, 
people continue to assume that homosexuality is a product of genetic 
defect or a result of traumatic childhood experience. 
In addition to biological concerns are moral and religious objec­
tions. Just as miscegenation purportedly violated God's will, sex and 
marriage between homosexuals is commonly condemned as violating 
the Bible or otherwise blasphemous. Others, who may disclaim 
reliance on religious doctrine, nonetheless oppose same-sex intimacy 
as morally repugnant or inconsistent with deeply rooted tradition. 
Expressly linking the deviance of interracial sex with homosexuality, 
the protagonist in one novel explained, "[i]t is a tragedy if a black man 
lets himself love something in a white woman, just as it is if a man lets 
himself get fucked by another man."31 
30. I am not the first to observe similarities between discrimination against interracial 
and same-sex relationships, particularly in the context of marriage. For sources defending 
the analogy between antimiscegenation laws and bans on same-sex marriage, see, for 
example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 153-63 (1996); 
MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 66-67 
(1997); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men ls Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: 
Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93 (1993). For sources 
criticizing the analogy, see, for example, David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: 
Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201 (1998); Richard F. 
Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment, 12 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 239 (1998); Lynn Marie Kohm, Liberty and Marriage - Baehr and Beyond: Due 
Process in 1998, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 253 (1998); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Con­
stitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. l. Kennedy also notes some of 
the ways in which attitudes toward interracial and intrasexual intimacies are similar, 
although he does not develop these points. My purpose in this Part is to draw principally on 
Kennedy's core observations and claims regarding interracial intimacies analyzed in Part I, 
and consider what lessons they suggest for analogous restraints on intrasexual intimacies that 
I identify. 
31. P. 135 (quoting CECIL BROWN, THE LIFE AND LOVES OF MR. J!VEASS NIGGER 205 
(1969)). 
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The strength and scope of opposition to same-sex intimacy is also 
reminiscent of antimiscegenation ideology. Recall that antimiscegena­
tion laws were the most widespread and tenacious of segregationist 
laws. Similarly, although discrimination against gays and lesbians has 
diminished in recent decades, bans on same-sex marriage remain 
universal, with only one state recognizing marriage-like unions.32 
Notice, moreover, .that while the Republican-controlled Senate in 1996 
fell just one vote short of protecting homosexuals· from .employment 
discrimination, the same year saw Congress, with overwhelming sup­
port from both sides of the aisle, pass the Defense of Marriage Act,33 
which was signed forthwith by a Democratic President who had run as 
a gay rights supporter.34 Animosity toward same-sex intimacy is also 
characterized by a: visceral emotionality and tendency to violence. 
Illustrated most infamously by the murder of Matthew Shepherd, 
condemnation of those who would seek intimacy with people of the 
same sex has involved a degree of hatred and cruelty expressed 
through torture, mutilation, and castration, the brutality of which is 
matched only by the lynching of blacks that produced the "strange 
fruit" of the South. There is something about sex and intimacy in vio­
lation of accepted norms, whether across racial or within sexual lines, 
that provokes the deepest fears and violent rage. 
Also apparent in the same-sex context, as with race, is the extent to 
which intimacy, particularly expressed through marital commitment, is 
more offensive than sexual conduct by itself. Consider, for example, 
the extent to which laws against sodomy have been repealed or have 
been rarely enforced against homosexuals compared to the political 
activism to deny homosexuals the right to marry. Consider also that in 
1986,35 although the Supreme Court upheld the criminalization of 
homosexual sodomy, it did so by a bare majority, with subsequent 
regrets by Justice Powell, and the Court firmly repudiated that prece­
dent this past term.36 A constitutional challenge to bans on same-sex 
marriage, in contrast, would most likely fall on deaf ears in the 
Supreme Court. Thus, as of this past term, homosexual adults have a 
constitutional right to consensual sex, but no constitutional or other 
legal right in any state to be married. Consider finally the military's 
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.37 A service-member who has engaged 
32. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
33. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7  (2000)). 
34. See Carolyn Lochhead & David Tuller, Gays Hoping Clinton Will Do Better In 2nd 
Term, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 12, 1996, at Al (describing enactment of Defense of Marriage Act 
and Senate defeat of Employment Non-Discrimination Act); Nancy Mathis, President to 
Address Gay Rights Group, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 8, 1997, at 1 (same). 
35. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
36. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (overruling Bowers as incorrect 
when decided and incorrect today). 
37. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000). 
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in sexual acts with a member of the same sex may defend against 
expulsion by demonstrating his misconduct was out of character.38 The 
mere attempt to marry a person of the same sex, however, with or 
without sexual consummation, is irrebuttable grounds for expulsion.39 
Sex is thus forgivable, provided it did not reflect an ongoing relation­
ship or, worse, a desire to commit to each other for life. 
Significant · to both opposition to interracial and intrasexual 
marriage is a belief in the procreative purpose of marriage. Recall that 
resistance to interracial marriage was based in part on the concern that 
the offspring would be genetically or mentally defective. The concern 
regarding same-sex marriage is similar, although not identical. The 
concern is that same-sex unions are biologically incapable of produc­
ing offspring. In both contexts, however, the restriction of marital 
intimacy to heterosexual couples of the same race has been justified by 
defining a central purpose of marriage as the healthy procreation of 
the human species. 
Although homosexuals are probably less likely to produce biologi­
cal offspring, especially by both partners,40 they can form families with 
children through adoption. Here too, however, the law discourages 
intimacy with homosexuals. Desires by homosexuals to adopt children 
have been legally prohibited or discouraged for reasons akin to 
traditional and contemporary opposition to transracial adoption. In 
addition to historical beliefs that interracial and same-sex intimacies 
were immoral, unnatural, and even criminal, and therefore inappro­
priate placements for children, opposition to adoption in both contexts 
has more recently emphasized potential difficulties for the children as 
a result of societal prejudice. With respect to race, transracial adoption 
raises concerns about the negative reactions from society to the inter­
racial nature of the family, and to the adopted status of the family, a 
status more readily revealed by transracial adoption, and which 
continues to be viewed by some, misguidedly, as a second-best alterna­
tive to biological families. Race has also figured in custody disputes 
between biological parents, in cases where one parent subsequently 
enters an interracial relationship or where the disputing couple itself is 
interracial and it is claimed by the black parent that the child's 
interests would be served better by placement with the parent of the 
"same" and more appropriate racial identity. 
Similarly, concerns over adoptions by homosexuals center on the 
potential difficulty to the child from societal prejudice toward the 
38. See § 654(b)(l)(A). 
39. See § 654(b)(3). 
40. Whether advances in biomedical technology will enable homosexual couples in the 
future to produce biological children jointly is uncertain. If such technology were developed, 
the distinction between interracial and intrasexual marriage based on procreative grounds 
would be further undermined. 
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parents' sexual orientation. Having parents of the same sex also 
suggests stigmatically that the child is not biologically related to at 
least one of the parents. And in custody disputes between biological 
parents, the fact that one of the parents has become intimately 
involved with a person of the same sex has been grounds for prefer­
ring the other parent. Finally, consider the question of identity in the 
child-placement context. As Kennedy describes, opponents of transra­
cial placement have complained that a black child raised by white 
parents will fail to develop a healthy racial identity or, worse, will 
develop a white identity. Adoption by homosexual parents has also 
been resisted on the ground the child may have difficulty regarding his 
sexual identity or, worse, may develop a homosexual identity. 
Parallels can also be seen between race and sexual orientation 
regarding issues of identity, especially the desire by some to conceal 
their identities from others. Recall Kennedy's account of people who 
"pass" as another race. In the sexual-orientation context, gays and 
lesbians often "closet" their sexual orientation to guard against legal 
and social sanction, or otherwise to experience the rights and privi­
leges of heterosexual supremacy.41 Burdens similar to those faced 
by passing blacks in guarding against discovery and in experiencing 
reprisals when discovered continue to be experienced by homosexuals 
in significant ways. Indeed, the toll on homosexuals may be worse. 
Blacks who pass as white can express romantic affection for a white 
spouse or lover at social gatherings or in public without revealing their 
race or the interracial character of the relationship. For homosexual 
couples, in contrast, concealing their sexual orientation from others 
usually requires completely concealing the intimate nature of their 
relationship while in view of others. 
The phenomenon of concealment also raises political questions 
for other members of the respective subordinated groups. Some 
homosexuals question the motives of those who pass as straight, ques­
tion whether sexual assimilation reinforces heterosexism, and question 
whether "outing" them would serve the cause of gay rights. As 
Kennedy describes, blacks have also faced political dilemmas of a 
similar nature with respect to passing, including whether to reveal the 
identity of passers. In fact, the dilemma whether to reveal passers' 
identities in both contexts is prompted in part by the capacity of gays 
and blacks to identify those who are, respectively, in the sexual closet 
or racially passing. Many gays purport to be able to identify other gays 
even when straight people cannot by use of so-called "gaydar."42 
41. For an interesting exploration of the phenomenon of "gay passing," see Kenji 
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 811-37 (2002). 
42. See Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 222, 232 n.57 
(1996) (reviewing JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, 
COLOR, COMMUNITY (1995)) (referring to "lesbians, and gays, apparent ability to recognize 
each other by cues too subtle for heterosexuals - an ability sometimes referred to as 
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Similarly, blacks often claim superior ability to identify blacks passing 
as white. As Ralph Ellison explained, "most Negroes can spot a paper 
thin 'White Negro' every time."43 
The burdens of discrimination have been so great in both contexts 
that some people have sought not merely to conceal their racial or 
sexual identities, but to alter them permanently. Gays have sought, 
with considerable difficulty, to make intimate relationships with the 
opposite sex succeed, and have even resorted to psychiatric treatment 
to become heterosexual. In the racial context as well, some blacks, 
especially those light-skinned enough to pass, have denied their 
blackness, even to themselves, and sought to change their race perma­
nently through cosmetic treatments, and have even resorted to surgery 
to appear more white. Fred Korematsu, for example, the subject of 
the Supreme Court case upholding the military exclusion of 
Japanese-Americans, had undergone plastic surgery to westernize his 
appearance (p. 317). 
Passing by homosexuals and blacks has also been motivated by a 
desire to serve in the military, a context in which both groups have 
been historically excluded. Gays continue to be excluded from military 
service, although since the Clinton Administration only if they engage 
in conduct that reveals their sexual orientation.44 Thousands of gays 
nonetheless serve their country honorably by concealing their sexual 
orientation. Similarly, blacks were historically excluded from military 
service and later permitted to serve only on a segregated basis until 
1948. Throughout American history, light-skinned blacks wishing to 
serve in the military on the same terms as whites have attempted to 
conceal their black identity. Kennedy recounts, for example, the expe­
rience of Albert Johnston, a black physician whose light skin enabled 
him to pass, who was interrogated by a suspicious naval intelligence 
agent about his racial lineage. Johnston evasively answered, "Who 
knows what blood any of us has in his veins?"45 Dr. Johnston subse­
quently received a letter of rejection .. Apparently, at least with respect 
to race, the military did not have a policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." 
A final parallel that Kennedy's inquiry helps to highlight is · that 
opposition to interracial and intrasexual intimacy both involve 
conduct-based discrimination. This point is worth emphasis because 
discrimination against homosexuals is often distinguished from racial 
'gaydar' "); see also Fine-tuning Your 'Gaydar, ' PHILA. DAILY INQUIRER, Nov. 5, 2002, at 
C2; Turning the Gaydar on Survivor, ADVOCATE: NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN NEWSMAGAZINE, 
Mar. 19, 2002, at 24. 
· 
43. P. 316 n.t (quoting RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 124 (1953)); see also id. 
(citing Amy Robinson, It Takes One to Know One: Passing and Communities of Common 
Interest, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 715 (1994)). 
44. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000). 
45. P. 325 n.* (quoting w. L. WHITE, LOST BOUNDARIES 32 (1947)). 
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discrimination on the ground the former involves conduct whereas the 
latter involves status. Then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin 
Powell, for example, made this point in distinguishing the military's 
exclusion of gays from racial segregation.46 .The ostensible distinction 
between race and sexual orientation is that race is a trait that one 
cannot choose or change, whereas homosexuality inherently involves 
conduct that one can choose to avoid. Even if sexual "orientation" 
itself is a status, provided discrimination against homosexuals is based 
only upon expressions or actions revealing their sexual orientation, it 
is purportedly distinguishable from discrimination against racial 
minorities. What Kennedy's inquiry reveals, however, is the extent to 
which America's racism included discrimination based on conduct, 
discrimination we rightfully repudiate today. Punishment of interracial 
relationships involved discrimination against those who engaged in 
conduct of an intimate nature with a person of a different race. 
Indeed, the reaction against people who engaged in interracially 
intimate conduct was often more severe than that directed toward 
blacks for simply being black. Similarly, in child-custody disputes in 
which courts have removed children from custodial parents who inter­
racially married, the courts' actions were in response to the custodial 
parent's conduct. To make the point in the military context, imagine a 
policy that permitted the races to serve on an integrated basis but 
expelled anyone who attempted to marry interracially. While the 
policy would avoid discrimination based on race alone, we would 
nonetheless consider the policy racially discriminatory and wrong. In­
deed, the Supreme Court upheld as compelling the government's in­
terest in revoking Bob Jones University's tax-exempt status in 
response to the university's policy of prohibiting . interracial relation­
ships.47 Consider finally antimiscegenation · laws themselves, such as 
those invalidated in Loving v. Virginia.48 Such laws constituted 
conduct-based discrimination. Criminal prosecution required proving 
the conduct of interracial marriage. Opposition to interracial and 
intrasexual intimacies thus both involve discriminations based on 
voluntary conduct of an interracial or intrasexual nature. 
What insights can be gained from drawing the forgoing parallels? 
They do not, without more, suffice to condemn opposition to same-sex 
intimacy as comparably repugnant to segregationism. I acknowledge 
the parallels may not be exact. Perhaps the scientific, religious, and 
moral objections to same-sex intimacies are really justified, whereas 
46. See 139 CONG. REC. 13,520 (1993) (statement of Sen. Coats) (quoting Colin Powell 
as stating, "Skin color is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is per­
haps the most profound of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the two is a 
convenient but invalid argument."). 
47. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
48. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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the beliefs underlying antimiscegenation laws were unfounded, despite 
the depth of sincerity with which segregationists held them. Perhaps 
the fact that homosexuals cannot, as far as we know, create offspring 
together differentiates antimiscegenation policies that were based on 
faulty eugenics, although this justification is suspect to the extent the 
law does not require heterosexuals to have the desire or capacity to 
procreate as a condition of marriage and, indeed, the law could not 
constitutionally do so. And perhaps societal attitudes against gay 
couples justify legal restrictions on their right to adopt children, 
although this does not explain why similar attitudes against interracial 
couples "may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, 
directly or indirectly, give them effect,"49 or why the predictable 
damage to children of parentlessness does not outweigh the specula­
tive risks associated with adoption by homosexual parents. 
Engaging these points is beyond the scope of this Review, but the 
parallels between interracial and intrasexual intimacies suggest, at the 
very least, that comfortable reliance on current notions of biological 
appropriateness, religious interpretation, and moral tradition may be 
tragically misguided or cruel. Consider that, despite the severe legal 
and social restrictions against same-sex intimacies, such relationships 
have developed throughout human history. Although not succeeding 
in eradicating homosexuality, society has succeeded in causing misery 
to those members of our national community with homosexual orien­
tations. The extent to which science, religion, and morality provide, in 
hindsight, inadequate bases for punishing interracial intimacies 
between consenting adults calls into question the adequacy of such 
justifications for punishing intrasexual intimacies between consenting 
adults. The lessons learned from Kennedy's inquiry into interracial 
intimacies should at least shift the burden to those who defend 
society's punishment of same-sex intimacies, especially through the 
coercive power of the state. Unless justifications can be advanced for 
opposing same-sex intimacies that are more persuasive than those 
used to oppose interracial intimacies; we should recognize that such 
opposition may simply be a product of irrational fear and prejudice. 
Perhaps the only real difference between interracial and intra­
sexual intimacies is time. Both ideologies may simply reflect the 
cultural norms of historical periods, not intrinsic moral truths. 
Antimiscegenation laws are wrong by present standards, bans on 
same-sex marriage are not. Perhaps, then, segregation was not wrong 
when practiced, it has only become wrong as society has changed its 
attitude towards it. For those who believe, however, that segregation, 
including the legal and social punishment of interracial intimacy, was 
49. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (acknowledging that societal prejudice 
against mother's interracial second remarriage could harm child but holding that law could 
not give effect to such prejudice in determining child's custodial placement). 
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wrong when practiced, then the punishment of those who love 
intrasexually may likewise be wrong presently, whether or not society 
understands it. The question then is how much time will it take before 
societal attitudes toward intrasexual intimacies change, before 
America escapes the moral myopia of the present generation? Which 
generation will be able to claim, with the pride of the civil rights 
generation of the twentieth century, "we did it." Which generation will 
be able to ask, as Americans do today regarding slavery and segrega­
tion, "what was wrong with America then?" 
CONCLUSION 
Kennedy closes his book by re-emphasizing his optimism in mat-
ters of race: 
Commentary on race relations in the United States can be usefully di­
vided into two broad traditions. One is a pessimistic tradition that doubts 
either the wisdom or the possibility of achieving racial harmony on the 
basis of racial equality . . . .  Running counter to this current is an optimis­
tic tradition that affirms both the wisdom and the possibility of bringing 
into being a racially egalitarian society in which individuals may enjoy 
their freedoms without racial constraint . . . .  Although both of these tra­
ditions figure prominently in the stories I have told in the previous pages, 
it should be clear by now that I myself am firmly in the latter camp. (p. 
519) 
Kennedy's lesson of optimism also provides hope for the future of 
intrasexual intimacies in American society, a hope Kennedy shares: 
It is my own belief that the struggle to secure the right to marry 
regardless of the genders of the parties involved will be won in the not so 
distant future. That achievement, I am convinced, will represent a real 
step up in the moral elevation of American democracy - a step facili­
tated, in large part, by previous struggles over race relations. (p. 279 n. *) 
Signs of progress are indeed evident. Just as restrictions on interracial 
intimacies have loosened considerably over the last half century, the 
rights of gays and lesbians to live free of . violence and discrimination 
have gained ground in recent decades. Many local jurisdictions guar­
antee rights against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
and state-level protections are emerging as well. And the ability for 
gays and lesbians to express their intimacies openly is increasing 
significantly, especially in certain locales. That is not to discount 
the serious discrimination still directed against homosexuals, but 
to recognize the encouraging direction of change. Interracial 
Intimacies should serve to encourage further change in the direction of 
self-determination in matters of intimacy and identity with respect to 
race and, by implication, with respect to sexual orientation. I applaud 
the effort, and gladly add my voice to Kennedy's and to the many 
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advocates of equality who raised their voice, when the risks of doing 
so were much greater, to proclaim "Live and let live, live and let love." 
